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Is frequency an explanatory causal concept in linguistics? 
 
 
In the last two decades, the use of quantitative methods in synchronic and diachronic 
linguistics has been booming. Surely, this development is to be welcomed, if only because it 
has enriched the ways of thinking about various important problems of linguistic inquiry. 
Many linguists now agree that data on frequencies of occurrence serve more than just 
illustrative purposes. Anyone who has taken the trouble to study large amounts of language 
data in view of the subtleties of formal and semantic variation, both synchronically and 
diachronically, will readily admit that corpus-based research – and quantitative variationist 
research at large – reveals more than any intuition-based or introspection-based focus can 
provide. As a rule, the outcome of such analyses is likely to make a linguist a more humble 
scholar: if linguistic research does not restrict itself to the identification of “clear cases” in the 
grammar (Itkonen 2003, see Willems 2012 for discussion), naturally occurring utterances 
more often than not show a much greater amount of variation than what one would expect on 
the basis of one’s own linguistic competence. However, this finding is as much in need of 
explanation as the structure of an individual’s knowledge of grammar. 
One example may suffice to demonstrate the importance of the issue. For many years now 
I have been intrigued by phenomena of case variation in German. Time and again I have 
observed that what you find in large corpora of naturally occurring language is often at 
variance with what traditional grammars and dictionaries of German claim. Take, for instance, 
the variation in case marking of the prepositional phrase with the labile verb aufsetzen in the 
meaning ‘land on’ in present-day German. It is customary (e.g., Ágel 2000: 165) to explain 
the use of either accusative or dative as follows: In (1) aufsetzen is causative and because the 
sentence is transitive, the prepositional phrase is said to have a ‘directional’ meaning which 
triggers the use of accusative (examples from Ágel 2000: 165): 
 
(1) Der Pilot setzte die Maschine sicher auf dieACC Piste auf. 
‘The pilot landed the aircraft safely on the runway.’ 
 
Conversely, it is maintained that aufsetzen is a recessive verb in (2) and in accordance 
with the intransitivity of the sentence the prepositional phrase is said to have a ‘locative’ 
meaning and therefore dative marking: 
 
(2) Das Flugzeug setzte auf demDAT Boden auf. 
‘The aircraft landed on the ground.’ 
 
The proposed explanation can thus be summarized as follows: 
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Figure 1 
 
But if you browse the Mannheim Deutsches Referenzkorpus (http://www.ids-
mannheim.de/cosmas2/), which is a 5,5 billion word corpus of mainly newspaper texts, the 
empirical findings present a very different picture. The numbers in the chart below record the 
case variation in an exploratory corpus sample of 361 randomly selected example sentences 
with aufsetzen in the meaning ‘land on’ in present-day German: 
 
 Accusative Dative TOTAL 
Intransitive 3 312 315 
Transitive 4 42 46 
TOTAL 7 354 361 
Figure 2 
 
Not only do we see that the intransitive construction with aufsetzen in this particular 
meaning is much more common than the transitive construction, we also find that dative is 
much more frequent than accusative even in transitive sentences (see, e.g., 3). Conversely, 
although few in number, accusative is attested in intransitive sentences as well (see, e.g., 4). 
 
(3) Schließlich gelingt es den Piloten wie durch ein Wunder, das Flugzeug sicher auf 
derDAT Landebahn des Moskauer Militärflughafens Tschkalowo aufzusetzen. 
‘As if by magic, the pilot finally succeeds in landing the airplane safely on the runway 
of the Chkalovsky military airport in Moscow.’ 
 
(4) Es ist 23.27 Uhr am Dienstag, Ortszeit Rabat, als das Flugzeug auf dieACC 
Landebahn aufsetzt. 
‘It is Tuesday 23.27 o’clock, Rabat local time, when the plane lands on the runway.’ 
 
These observations squarely contradict the traditional explanation of the case alternation 
according to which no dative marking is to be expected in the transitive construction and no 
accusative marking in the intransitive construction. The conclusion must be that a seemingly 
clear-cut instance of case distribution, which according to traditional accounts that are not 
based on corpus-data can be explained by means of a straightforward pair of dichotomies, viz. 
intransitive + dative (locative) vs. transitive + accusative (directional), turns out not to be so 
once corpus data are taken into consideration. Although the correlation between transitivity 
and case marking is still statistically significant with regard to our sample of 361 sentences (χ² 
 Accusative 
(‘directional’) 
Dative 
(‘locative’) 
Intransitive –  
Transitive  – 
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= 8.9121, df = 1, p-value = 0.003, bearing in mind, however, the low number of sentences 
with accusative; Fisher-Exact test: p-value = 0.006), the bare observations in Figure 2 cast 
serious doubt on the linguistic validity of the presumed relationship between the 
morphosyntactic difference between the transitive and intransitive structure, the semantic 
categories ‘directional’ and ‘locative’ and the choice for either accusative or dative. 
Findings such as these have potentially important implications for the general debate 
about the relationship between grammar and usage, and in particular the role of (token) 
frequency in this discussion. There can be no doubt that it is part and parcel of the German 
grammatical system that aufsetzen strongly correlates with a prepositional phrase in the dative 
when used intransitively in the conventionalized sense of ‘land on’. But at the same time the 
aforementioned quantitative observations indicate that the use of the “normal” dative in this 
particular syntactic and semantic environment competes with the use of the accusative which 
however appears to be much less common, to the extent that even in transitive sentences, 
instances of dative marking by far outnumber occurrences of accusative marking. There is 
obviously no point in trying to resolve the issue by simply postulating, on the one hand, that 
there is a rule of German grammar according to which intransitive aufsetzen auf ‘land on’ 
governs the dative and takes on a locative meaning, whereas transitive aufsetzen auf ‘land on’ 
governs the accusative and takes on a directional meaning, while on the other hand relegating 
all intransitive instances governing the accusative and all transitive instances governing the 
dative to ultimately extra-grammatical, “deviant” variation in language use. Such a 
dichotomous explanation, apart from being falsified by the data, ignores the fact that positing 
such a rule of grammar would be arbitrary from the outset. What is more, even if certain 
native speakers of German would subscribe to this rule, and hence endorse the ensuing 
dichotomous explanation because in their judgment it adequately captures the case alternation 
with intransitive/transitive aufsetzen ‘land on’ in their idiolect, this would still not prove its 
validity because it is not supported by the empirical evidence in the corpus data. But does this 
entail that the distinction between grammar and usage is spurious or altogether dispensable? 
Does it entail that an account of usage data based on probabilities and statistically significant 
preferences can ultimately supplant, rather than supplement, the scholarly identification of 
grammatical rules? 
Newmeyer (2003, 2005, 2006) has forcefully expressed the view that corpus-based 
frequency studies can add nothing to our understanding of the grammar of any particular 
individual, although he recognizes that “language users and hence their grammars are 
sensitive to frequency” (Newmeyer 2003: 697, see also 2006: 705). According to Newmeyer, 
“variationist work on the grammar/usage interface does not entail as a necessary consequence 
that properties of grammars and statistical generalizations about the use of constructs 
provided by grammars are part and parcel of the same cognitive system” (Newmeyer 2006: 
706). In contrast, authors such as Guy (2005) maintain that speakers not only are sensitive to 
frequencies but that any model of linguistic competence has to incorporate the kind of 
probabilistic information that can be extracted from variationist research (cf. also Clark 2005, 
Meyer/Tao 2005, Laury/Tsuyoshi 2005). To my mind, with due qualifications one can agree 
with both these points of view without contradiction.  
On the one hand, any realistic grammar of a language has to acknowledge the existence of 
several kinds of variation, that is, not only variation resulting from the various ways 
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grammatical rules are instantiated in language use (on which, to my knowledge, all linguists 
agree) but also variation as an intrinsic feature of grammar itself. The latter kind of variation 
is what Guy (2005: 561), following Weinreich, Labov & Herzog (1968), calls “inherent 
variability”, which he further distinguishes from “orderly heterogeneity”, its counterpart in 
discourse. Succinctly put: there simply is no perfectly consistent grammatical system apart 
from the abstract system linguists offer of a natural language.  
On the other hand, I concur with Newmeyer (2003, 2005, 2006) that acknowledging 
speakers’ sensitivity to frequencies does not invalidate the distinction between grammar and 
language use. Without this distinction linguistic accounts are bound to be confusing and self-
contradictory. It should not come as a surprise, for example, that in Hymesian ethnographic 
research of communicative practices in different socio-cultural settings the aforementioned 
distinction is typically maintained: 
 
Speakers of a language in particular communities are able to communicate with each other in a manner 
which is not only correct but also appropriate to the socio-cultural context. This ability involves a 
shared knowledge of the linguistic code as well as of the socio-cultural rules, norms and values which 
guide the conduct and interpretation of speech. (Farah 1997: 125).  
 
One can describe but not explain empirically observable language variation without 
assuming that any one speaker, whenever engaged in the activity of speech, calls upon shared 
knowledge of a “systematic nature”. This knowledge is multifaceted, as Farah (1997) rightly 
points out in the above quote, but it certainly includes knowledge of language-specific 
phonemic, prosodic, morphological and syntactic rules, all of which are co-extensive with the 
knowledge of language-specific meanings (“signifiés” in the sense of Saussure, as opposed to 
world knowledge and conventionalized senses).  
However, it is important to stress that the distinction which supporters as well as 
detractors draw between (knowledge of) grammar and language use pertains to the domain of 
linguistic inquiry and not to the domain of language as the object of inquiry. Viewed from 
that angle, the claim in modern linguistics that the rigid distinction between the Saussurian 
langue and parole has to be overcome is absolutely justified, and corpus-based and 
variationist research is certainly among the most promising avenues to meet this challenge. 
But this requires a theoretically consistent view of language as a creative human activity 
alongside the premises of its scientific inquiry in linguistic research. Coseriu (1973), in his 
still unsurpassed treatise on the theory of historical linguistics, explains this relationship as 
follows: 
 
Por consiguiente, siendo ἐνέργεια en el sentido humboldtiano y aristotélico, el hablar es idealmente 
anterior a la “lengua” y su objeto (que es la significación) es necesariamente infinito. En este sentido, 
el lenguaje no se define satisfactoriamente cuando se dice que es “la actividad que emplea signos [ya 
hechos]”: hay que definirlo como “actividad creadora de signos”. Eso, idealmente. Históricamente, en 
cambio, la “potencia” es anterior al “acto”. Hay que integrar, pues, la libertad con la historicidad: en 
cuanto actividad histórica, el hablar es siempre hablar una “lengua”, que es δύναμις histórica; y, en 
cuanto actividad libre, el hablar no depende enteramente de su potencia, sino que la supera. […] La 
lengua es una “abstracción” solo técnicamente, para el lingüista que la deduce de la actividad 
lingüística, y, si puede “abstraerse”, es porque existe (como modo de hablar y como saber lingüístico) y 
porque ya al empezar su estudio tenemos el “conocimiento previo” de su objetividad. Por otra parte, y 
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contrariamente a lo que a menudo se piensa, el reconocer la objetividad de la “lengua” y el estudiarla 
como tal no significa “aislarla” o “separarla” del hablar. El positivismo lingüístico, por su tendencia a 
“cosificar” las abstracciones, llega, en efecto, a considerar la “lengua” y el “habla” como dos cosas 
distintas y, en lugar de colocar la lengua en el hablar, coloca el “habla” en los individuos y la “lengua” 
en la sociedad (o peor, en la “masa”), como si los individuos fueran asociales y la sociedad fuera 
independiente de los individuos y de sus relaciones interindividuales. (Coseriu 1973: 47-50) 
 
In other words, while discourse (“language use”) is the source of language (“grammar”) in 
terms of the “conditions of possibility” (Kant) of language, historically discourse is the 
realization of grammar, i.e. grammatical knowledge. Discourse is emphatically not simply 
“using” rules of grammar (cf. Coseriu 1985; 2007: 69–75). It therefore seems appropriate to 
rephrase Newmeyer’s famous dictum ‘grammar is grammar and usage is usage’ in order to 
overcome its inherent dichotomous perspective: ‘grammar is part of discourse, and discourse 
creates grammar’.  
This point of view resolves a seeming paradox. On the one hand, corpus data are much 
richer than the speech production of a single speaker; on the other hand, what native speakers 
can produce on the basis of their language competence is richer than anything we will ever 
find in corpora. This is so because “language as ἐνέργεια is infinite” (Coseriu) and because 
actual discourse always goes beyond that which generations of speakers have already 
produced; at the same time the number and variation of structures in texts included in corpora 
of course exceed the discourse produced by any one individual. Corpora provide data that 
native speakers may not be aware of (Meyer/Tao 2005: 228); but corpora cannot be used to 
prove what is not possible in a language. Let me briefly touch on the consequences of this 
position for the discussion about the status of frequency data in linguistic explanations.  
In a stimulating discussion about the value of the notion of iconicity in language and 
linguistics, Haiman (2008) has taken issue with Haspelmath’s (2008a, b) argument that the 
concept of diagrammatic iconicity can be dispensed with in favour of frequency when 
explaining certain linguistic phenomena. Haspelmath acknowledges that iconicity can play a 
motivating role in language, e.g., as when the sequence of forms matches the sequence of 
experience or when forms that belong together tend to occur next to each other (Haspelmath 
2008a: 3). However, other structures which seem to be iconic are in fact motivated by 
frequency-induced (“Zipfian”) reduction, according to Haspelmath. For example, no appeal to 
iconicity is necessary to account for the fact that in most languages the singular often is 
morphologically shorter than the plural. Haspelmath’s alternative explanation is based on the 
assumption that a language system is both “economic” and “efficient” (Haspelmath 2008a: 5) 
and that “frequency of use implies short coding because frequent items are more predictable” 
(Haspelmath 2008b: 59). But note that one crucial question remains disturbingly unanswered: 
How does it come that the most frequent forms, which are the most predictable ones, are also 
the shortest ones? Obviously, the answer cannot be that this is so because they are the most 
frequent and predictable ones, that would be circular.1 Haiman (2008: 36) is right to point out 
that frequency is no “cognitive” explanation whatsoever in linguistics. But no solution to the 
                                                 
1  To be sure, the most frequent forms are the most predictable ones only from a dictionary point of view. From 
the point of view of discourse (i.e. the “text” with its typical properties of formal cohesion, semantic 
coherence, isotopy, information structure etc.), a form which is very likely to occur in the next sentence and 
which in this sense is highly predictable, may be infrequent in the language. 
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problem can be obtained without addressing a potential source of confusion: frequency – that 
is, token frequency – does not pertain to discourse, it is a feature of the product of discourse, 
i.e. the body of texts produced in a particular language. Therefore, frequency in itself cannot 
possibly account for why certain forms are shorter than other ones, although it is an important 
finding of quantitative research of texts that a correlation between frequency, predictability 
and length of forms can be identified and measured. Hence not the frequency but only the 
pervasive intention to produce shorter forms for particular functions (which have to be 
“meaningful”) in discourse can explain any frequency-induced reduction of linguistic forms 
that is observable in texts. Once again, I quote extensively from Coseriu (1973), because what 
he writes about the paradox of language change equally applies to the apparent “causality” of 
frequency in order to account for – or, better still, dismiss – iconicity in language:  
 
En el fondo, la perplejidad frente al cambio lingüístico y la tendencia a considerarlo como fenómeno 
espurio, provocado por “factores externos”, se deben al hecho de partir de la lengua abstracta – y, por 
lo tanto, estática –, separada del hablar y considerada como cosa hecha, como ergon, sin siquiera 
preguntarse qué son y cómo existen realmente las lenguas y qué significa propriamente un “cambio” en 
una lengua. De acquí también el planteamiento del problema del cambio en términos causales, puesto 
que los cambios en las “cosas” desligados de la intencionalidad de todo sujeto se atribuyen, 
precisamente, a “causas”. Pero la lengua no pertenece al orden causal sino al orden final, a los hechos 
que se determinan por su función. (Coseriu 1973: 29–30) 
 
Coseriu’s Humboldtian conception of language as “actividad creadora de signos” rather 
than an “actividad que emplea signos [ya hechos]” also resolves a vexing theoretical problem 
that any concept of “emergent grammar” such as that advocated by Paul Hopper is faced with. 
On the one hand, Hopper correctly points out that the grammar of a language is “constantly 
being restructured and resemanticized during actual use” (Hopper 1998: 159); emergence in 
this sense designates “a continual movement toward structure” (157). On the other hand, 
Hopper takes his rejection of the dichotomy between grammar and usage to be equivalent to 
the view that linguistic structure is “epiphenomenal”, that is, “an effect rather than a cause” 
(157), and he defines emergent regularities as “the sediment of frequency” (161; cf. also 158). 
But this brings us back to the much maligned dichotomy, albeit on a more abstract level, 
rather than overcoming it. An epiphenomenal effect of language use that results in a sediment 
of forms and structures is precisely the kind of thing (“cosa”) that, severed from its sources 
(i.e., various discourse practices), may be construed as the ‘static’ prerequisite of ‘dynamic’ 
language use.2 In this sense, theoretically separating language use from grammar amounts to 
objectifying language in order to make it amenable to causal explanations. However, 
whatever the merits are of establishing causal relationships with respect to classifying various 
quantitative features of texts and even predicting the likelihood with which a particular 
structure occurs under specific conditions (see, e.g., Bresnan & Ford 2010), causal 
explanations do not, and cannot, fully explain the intentional, and fundamentally historical, 
activity human beings are engaged in when they create language. 
                                                 
2  Note that Newmeyer’s position is diametrically opposed to what Hopper claims. Newmeyer (2006: 402) 
writes that probabilities are not part of knowledge of grammar but “totally epiphenomenal”. In the approach 
that I advocate, Hopper’s and Newmeyer’s views are equally problematic on this point. 
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To round off this discussion note, let us return to our initial example of case alternation in 
the context of prepositional constructions with verbs such as aufsetzen in German. Postulating 
simple dichotomous rule-sentences which are based on apparently simplifying interpretations 
of a few artificially constructed examples along the lines of traditional grammars and 
dictionaries is certainly not going to help us in finding an explanation of the observed 
variation between accusative and dative. I dare say that no native speaker of German has ever 
come up with an entirely satisfactory explanation of the case alternation, in spite of being 
fully competent in the language and not feeling the urge to account for something that most 
likely does not constitute any hindrance to communication most of the time. However, this 
does not invalidate scholarly endeavours that set out to accommodate the observed variation 
in the grammar. Likewise, corpus-based findings that clearly contradict traditional accounts of 
grammatical variation do not by themselves entail that the distinction between grammar and 
usage is dispensable, nor that an account of usage data based on probabilities and statistically 
significant preferences can simply supplant the formulation of grammatical rules. Quite on the 
contrary, such findings are an invitation to reconsider already existing explanations and 
explore alternative ones that better fit the facts. With respect to the observed case alternation 
of prepositional constructions with verbs such as aufsetzen in German, for instance, it is 
imperative to take into consideration various factors that have received no or only scant 
attention in the past, including paradigmatic and syntagmatic contrasts, correlations between 
constructions of varying complexity and case preferences, defeasible default case marking in 
relation to conventionalized senses at the level of “normal language use” (Coseriu 1973: 53–
57), etc. (cf. Willems 2011 and Willems, Rys, De Cuypere Forthc. for more elaborate 
accounts). To the extent that multifactorial quantitative analyses are able to capture subtle 
interactions between a diverse array of factors, one may be confident that their empirical 
findings will greatly benefit the ensuing grammatical analyses without falling prey to a naive 
positivism which confuses descriptive detail with a comprehensive understanding of language 
in discourse. 
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